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Tamper-evident logging for protecting cloud data 
ABSTRACT 
Users in a datacenter or cloud system, including privileged users (e.g., root-level users), 
should be accountable for all of their actions within the system, regardless of their privileges. A 
secure logging solution that is resistant to tampering can help achieve this objective. Techniques 
disclosed herein enable secure logging without compromising management of confidential data.  
More specifically, the disclosure describes a system that processes and stores log messages in 
such a way that they are tamper-evident. Tamper-evident logs can be virtually impervious to 
undetectable manipulation, even by the highly privileged root-level users of such a system. A 
secure, tamper-evident logging solution can be implemented using trusted platforms 
implemented in software or hardware, e.g., secure element platforms, secure enclave solutions, 
virtual trusted platform modules, etc.   
KEYWORDS 
Tamper-evident logs; trusted platforms; vTPM; secure logging; secure enclaves; privileged 
access; privileged user; root user 
BACKGROUND 
Applications running on datacenter servers, e.g., login daemons such as secure shell 
(sshd), provide access to users with recognized credentials. Such applications are accompanied 
by a logging subsystem. Logs are maintained to keep a historical record and are useful for 
tracking down issues and auditing application usage. A key assumption is that logs have not been 
manipulated to hide information or mislead others. In an unprotected system, despite access 
control restrictions, a malicious root user can log in, commit maleficent acts, and erase traces of 
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their actions from the log records.  Apart from manipulating the log contents by adding, editing 
or deleting the log records, such rogue users can also stop logging from occurring altogether.  
Such occurrences, or even possibilities thereof, can adversely impact users’/clients’ trust in the 
environment.  To avoid these situations, the logging system should securely capture all user login 
attempts before allowing a user to access critical resources.  
DESCRIPTION 
Fig. 1: Creating a tamper-evident log 
Techniques disclosed herein provide a secure logging system that a client application 
running on a datacenter machine or on a cloud can use to create a tamper-evident log message.  
Such a system is tamper-evident and verifiable, thereby offering protection of sensitive 
information. A tamper-evident logging system can be implemented on a trusted platform (using 
hardware and/or software) that enables detection of unauthorized changes to the log entries. 
Applications running in the datacenter or on a cloud can also use secure logging, as described 
herein, as a service to track and record login attempts into the applications prior to accepting the 
login connection.   
3
Defensive Publications Series, Art. 614 [2017]
http://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/614
 A trusted platform (102), shown in Fig. 1, generates a value (106) from a non-volatile 
monotonic counter, which value is incremented and included with every log message (108) that 
is generated (104). Adding this value to the log message (110) enables declarations about the 
consistency of messages stored in the logging system. As the current state of the monotonic 
counter can be read outside the trusted platform, the logging system can identify the appropriate 
range of values that should have been recorded for corresponding log messages.  If a value from 
this range is missing, then a record is determined to have been removed.  Moreover, fabricated 
messages will either collide with an existing record or exist outside of the valid range. 
After adding the monotonic counter value to the log message along with metadata, e.g., 
timestamp, the combination is hashed. The output of the rolling hash (114) is cryptographically 
signed (116) using an asymmetric private key (112) that is visible only within the platform.  As 
this key cannot be read outside the platform and is virtually impossible to forge, secure and 
tamper-evident log messages (118) are created and stored by the secure logging system.    
The trusted platform can be implemented either in hardware (e.g., secure element tamper 
resistant platform) or software (e.g. secure enclaves or virtual trusted platform modules).  In 
either case, the trusted platform provides a secure environment for indexing and signing each log 
message.  Also, this secure logging system can be delivered with virtual machines using a virtual 
trusted platform module (vTPM) as a source for the monotonic counter and private signing keys. 
Secure logging, as described herein, can be implemented with a caller that uses this 
system synchronously. It means the caller asks the secure logging system to create a log entry 
before it continues execution. The introduction of the trusted platform module into the logging 
data path may introduce some latency. To maintain compatibility with applications that cannot 
accommodate this latency, the secure logging system can be used in an asynchronous mode.  
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An advantage of the tamper-evident logging solution disclosed herein is its auditability.  
In addition to signals for detecting tampering, additional trusted metadata is appended to the 
tamper-evident log.  For instance, trusted timestamps and machine location information are 
added to enable auditability.  Auditability and management of log messages within a trusted 
platform increases trustworthiness of information.   
Applications running in the datacenter or on a cloud often handle legally protected 
information as well as personally identifiable information with users express consent and 
permission. There are strict legal requirements that such information be not accessed 
inappropriately or leaked to unauthorized viewers. By preventing access to such private or 
sensitive customer information, in addition to the integrity assurances, a secure logging system 
can offer confidentiality protection by encrypting log entries in addition to hashing and signing 
them to protect the content from unauthorized users, even from the datacenter or cloud service 
provider. To accomplish this, the logs are cryptographically hashed and also optionally 
encrypted. Hashing creates a unique value that directly corresponds to the original confidential 
content but that cannot be used to recreate the content.  The logging system only handles the 
hashes, and abstains from touching the original plaintext contents, or indeed any form of 
sensitive data. 
Customers should be able to verify that their logs have not been tampered with. This 
feature, of customer verifiability, is known as discoverability, and is an integral feature of the 
secure logging system described herein. The customers have the ability to rehash their own log 
contents, and these hashes can be supplied to the system for verification. The system then 
provides discrepancy reports to customers, who can then act on any issues. This enables 
customers to quickly determine if their logs have been tampered with.   
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The present techniques can also be useful for implementing NIST-related specifications, 
in particular, ones focused on the FIPS 140-2 crypto certification. Tamper-evident logging can 
also be enabled, for example, for secure ssh or shell access to datacenter machines. Such 
implementations can be based on a secure chip implementation that is embedded in the server's 
motherboard, within trusted execution environments of secure enclaves, or through a vTPM 
approach. 
CONCLUSION 
This disclosure describes techniques to generate and store tamper-evident user log 
messages. To ensure secure logging, a record is created of the login attempt(s) before the login 
request is accepted. Tamper-evident logs, described herein, are virtually impervious to 
undetectable manipulation, and users can track if their logs have been tampered with and take 
appropriate action if needed.  The tamper-evident secure logging system provides the facilities of 
auditability and discoverability while ensuring confidentiality. Auditability is ensured by the 
addition of trusted, encrypted meta-data, e.g., timestamps, machine location, etc., to the tamper 
evident log. Discoverability is ensured by giving a customer the facility to rehash their own log 
contents and present said rehashed contents for verification. Confidentiality of private and 
sensitive customer content is preserved by creating a cryptographic hash of the logging 
messages, and handling the hashes rather than the original plaintext contents.  
Cryptographic keys and counters used to generate the tamper-evident log messages are 
supplied by a trusted platform. In this manner, techniques disclosed herein enable privileged 
users, despite the many powerful tools at their disposal, to become accountable for all actions 
they perform. Techniques disclosed generally reduce the chance of malicious acts being 
performed by any user or customer, regardless of privilege level.   
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